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CASE COMMENT
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DISCLOSURE OF PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION
REPORTS IN CAPITAL CASES
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 439 (1977)
In Gardner v. Florida,' the Supreme Court expanded the procedural
protections which defendants convicted of capital crimes are entitled to at
sentencing. Except in carefully circumscribed situations,2 the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment3 prohibits a state from imposing
the death sentence on the basis of an undisclosed presentence investiga-
tion (PSI) report.
Petitioner was convicted in Florida of first degree murder,4 which is
punishable by either life imprisonment or death.5 In accordance with
Florida law, 6 there was a separate sentencing hearing before a jury.7 The
trial judge rejected the jury's advisory sentence of life imprisonment and,
on the basis of portions of a court-ordered PSI report8 that was neither
disclosed to the defendant nor included in the trial record,9 imposed the
1. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
2. See notes 82 & 99 infra and accompanying text.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. 430 U.S. AT 351.
5. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082 (West 1976).
6. "Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the
court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment." FLA. STAT. ANN § 921.141(1) (West
Supp. 1977). The constitutionality of FLA STAT. ANN. § 921.141 was upheld in Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). See generally Note, Bifurcating Florida's Capital Trials:
Two Steps Are Better Than One, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 127 (1971).
7. 430 U.S. at 352. The jury, in accordance with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)-(6)
(West Supp 1977), considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime.
8. Use of a presentence investigation and report is usually within the trial judge's
discretion, but is required when a minor or first offender is involved. FLA. R. CRINM. P.
3.710. Although defendant had an extensive police record, this was his first felony
conviction and a presentence report was mandatory.
9. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.713 requires disclosure of factual material in a presentence
report, but permits nondisclosure of evaluative and other material that the trial judge
determines is proper to withhold. The rule attempts to effectuate the policies of full
disclosure, while protecting confidential sources of information. FLA. R. CRIN. P. 3.713,
Comm. Notes. The Florida death penalty statute does not include a mandatory disclosure
provision, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1977), but is subject to FLA. R. CRIM.
P. 3.713.
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death penalty. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the conviction and
sentence;'" the United States Supreme Court, however, vacated the
sentence" and held: the imposition of the death sentence based on
considerations neither disclosed to the defendant nor incorporated in the
trial record violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 12
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that no
"State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."' 13 It specifically ensures that the principles of "funda-
mental fairness"' 4 guaranteed at the federal level by the Bill of Rights'5
are applied to state criminal proceedings.16 In addition, the clause 17
entitles litigants to fair procedures-due process-whenever their rights
may be adversely affected. 18 What process is "due"' 19 is determined by
balancing the effect of the proceeding on the defendant's rights20 and the
state's interests.21
10. Gardner v. State, 313 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1975), rev'd, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
11. By plurality. See note 75 infra.
12. 430 U.S. at 362.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
14. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). See generally J. SCARBORO & J.
WHITE, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, QUESTIONS, AND NOTES 67-82
(1977).
15. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
16. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (fifth amendment prohibition
of double jeopardy applied to states by fourteenth amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment right to jury trial); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (fifth amendment right against self-incrimination); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965) (confrontation of witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964)*(self-incrimina-
tion); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule to enforce fourth amendment
prohibition of illegal searches and seizures); In re Oliver, 333 U.S 257 (1948) (right to a
public trial).
17. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1971) (parole revocation); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof of guilt in juvenile proceeding); Mempa v. Rhay, 389
U.S. 128 (1967) (deferred sentencing); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (illegal
search).
19. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1971) ("[T]he process that is due"
connotes a flexible due process standard.).
20. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1971) (parolee's liberty interest); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile's liberty interest); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
(1966) (juvenile's interest to be tried as such).
21. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)
("consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of
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An accused person, having a recognized liberty interest in his life, has
traditionally been accorded due process in pre-trial and trial procedures.22
Once convicted, however, the defendant stood at the mercy of the state,
stripped of his rights, 23 with only minimal due process protection.24
Because convicted defendants were considered slaves of the state, 25
legislatures vested courts and corrections officials with virtually unbri-
dled discretion.26 In response to modern penal theories, later courts also
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government
function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by government
action") (military security interest); see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) (school
administration); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561 (1974) (prison administration);
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Assoc. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564
(1972) (state interest in efficient civil service). Cf. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415-
16, 422 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (cost to society from misapplied exclusionary
rule).
22. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
23. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
[The defendant] has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his
liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity
accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the State. He is civiliter
mortuus; and his estate, if he has any, is administered like that of a dead man.
The bill of rights is a declaration of general principles to govern a society of
freemen, and not of convicted felons and men civilly dead. Such men have some
rights it is true, such as the law in its benignity accords to them, but not the rights
of freemen. They are the slaves of the State undergoing punishment for heinous
crimes committed against the laws of the land. While in this state of penal
servitude, they must be subject to the regulations of the institution of which they
are inmates, and the laws of the State to whom their service is due in expiation of
their crimes.
Id. at 795-96.
24. See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942),
overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 129 (1934) (Roberts, J., dissenting); Calvaresi v. United States, 216 F.2d 891, 900-01
(10th Cir. 1954), rev'd, 348 U.S. 961 (1955); Bailey v. United States, 284 F. 126, 127 (7th
Cir. 1922); People v. Riley, 376 Ill. 364, 33 N.E.2d 872, cert. denied, 313 U.S. 586 (1941);
Mempa v. Rhay, 68 Wash. 2d 882, 892, 416 P.2d 104, 110 (1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 128
(1967). See generally Pugh & Carver, Due Process and Sentencing: From Mapp to Mempa
to McGautha, 49 TEX. L. REV. 25 (1970); Note, Right of Criminal Offenders to Challenge
Reports Used in Determining Sentence, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 567, 568 (1949).
25. See note 23 supra.
26. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974); Williams v. Oklahoma, 358
U.S. 576, 582-83 (1959); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); United States v.
Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1189 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
950 (1971); Beckett v. United States, 84 F.2d 731, 732-33 (6th Cir. 1936); Gurera v. United
States, 40 F.2d 338, 341 (8th Cir. 1930); State v. Levice, 59 Ariz. 472, 478, 130 P.2d 53, 55-
56 (1942); Pugh & Carver, supra note 24. But see K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
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considered the best interests of the convicted defendant in determining
punishment. 27
To aid in the fashioning of individualized sentences, many courts and
legislatures authorize presentence investigations into the offender's back-
ground and the circumstances of the crime.28 Because the offender had
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 133-41 (1969). See generally Chandler, Latter Day Procedures in the
Sentencing and Treatment of Offenders in the Federal Courts, 37 VA. L. REV. 825 (1951).
As long as the sentence is within the range authorized by statute the convicted may not
challenge it. See United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1061 (1972); Bowman v. United States, 350 F.2d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 950 (1966); Jones v. United States, 327 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Beckett
v. United States, 84 F.2d 731, 732-33 (6th Cir. 1936); Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338
(8th Cir. 1930). But see Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1973); United
States v. McKinney, 466 F.2d 1403 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967
(6th Cir. 1971).
Procedural due process did not obtain as of right after defendant had been convicted.
See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950); People v. Riley, 376 Ill. 364, 33 N.E.2d 872,
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 586 (1941); K. Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70
HARV. L. REV. 193, 256-59 (1956); Note, Due Process and Legislative Standards in
Sentencing, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 257, 261 (1952). See generally Cohen, Sentencing, Proba-
tion and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEX. L. REv. 1
(1968).
27. See Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1959); Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1949); United States v. Vandermark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir.
1975); United States v. Johnson, 507 F.2d 826, 829 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
949 (1975); United States v. Hopkins, 464 F.2d 816, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v.
Strauss, 443 F.2d 986, 990 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971); United States v.
Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 817 (2d Cir. 1970); Chandler, supra note 26, at 828-30; Yankwich,
Individualization of Punishment in the Federal Courts, 21 FED. PROBATION 3 (1957); Note,
Statutory Structure for Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1134 (1960); cf.
United States v. Schwartz, 500 F.2d 1350, 1352 (2d Cir. 1974) (sentence vacated as too
mechanically imposed). But see United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1189 (D.C. Cir.)
(Wright, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's
Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1291-93 (1952).
28. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (c) provides: "The probation service of the court shall
make a presentence investigation and report to the court before the imposition of sentence
or the granting of probation." It is common practice in state criminal procedure to require
or permit the use of presentence reports. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.10 (Deering
1970) (discretionary); IOWA CODE ANN. § 789A.3 (West Supp. 1977) (mandatory); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 549.245 (Vernon Supp. 1977) (discretionary); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.710
(discretionary unless minor or first felony conviction in which case it is mandatory); 8A
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 32.03[l], at 32-28 to 32-32 (2d ed. 1977); 2 C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 522, at 389 (1969); Lehrich, The Use and Disclo-
sure of Presentence Reports in the United States, 47 F.R.D. 225 (1969); Parsons, Aids in
Sentencing, 35 F.R.D. 423 (1964); Note, Use of the Presentence Investigation in Missouri,
1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 396. See generally Note, Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal
Court: Due Process and Judicial Discretion, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1527 (1975); Note, Due
Process in Sentencing: A Right to Rebut the Presentence Report?, 2 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1065 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Due Process in Sentencing].
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no recognized property or liberty interest entitled to due process protec-
tion at sentencing, courts held that he could not object to the use of the
PSI report29 and, consequently, he had no right to its diclosure. 0° The
sentencing court may, however, in its discretion, disclose the PSI re-
port.31 Proponents of nondisclosure claim it serves the following state
interests: maximizing the offender's rehabilitation by not disclosing con-
fidential and detrimental psychological information; protecting confiden-
tial sources of information; avoiding delay of criminal trials; and, pre-
serving the sentencing court's discretion. 32
A sample presentence report appears in F. REMINGTON, D. NEWMAN, E. KIMBALL, M.
MELLI, & H. GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION, MATERIALS AND CASES
690-96 (1969).
29. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251-52 (1949); United States v. Dock-
cry, 447 F.2d 1178, 1182-83 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); United States v.
Lloyd, 425 F.2d 711,712 (5th Cir. 1970); People v. Peace, 18 N.Y.2d 230, 233,219 N.E.2d
419, 420, 273 N.Y.S.2d 64, 66 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1967).
30. See Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 492 (1969) (dictum); cases cited note 29
supra.
31. See United States v. Dace, 502 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1121 (1975); United States v. Gorden, 495 F.2d 308 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833
(1974); United States v. Lloyd, 425 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1970); Cook v. Willingham, 400 F.2d
885 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Fischer, 381 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 973 (1968); Hoover v. United States, 268 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1959); United States v.
Durham, 181 F. Supp. 503 (D.D.C.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 854 (1960); People v. Peace, 18
N.Y.2d 230, 219 N.E.2d 419, 273 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1967);
Katkin, Presentence Reports: An Analysis of Uses, Limitations and Civil Liberties Issues,
55 MINN. L. REV. 15 (1970); Lehrich, supra note 28, at 228 & n.19. But see United States
v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1186 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
950 (1971).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Dace, 502 F.2d 897, 899 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1121 (1975); United States v. Knupp, 448 F.2d 412, 413 (4th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam); United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1185 & n.13 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 950 (1971); Hoover v. United States, 268 F.2d 787, 790 (10th Cir. 1959); United
States v. Durham, 181 F. Supp. 503, 504 (D.D.C.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 854 (1960);
McCormack v. State, 332 So. 2d 117, 118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Morgan v. State, 142
So. 2d 308, 311-12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Brief for Respondent at 19-22, 29-34,
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); Roche, The Position for Confidentiality of the
Presentence Investigation Report, 29 ALB. L. REv. 206, 217-24 (1965); Note, Due Process
in Sentencing, supra note 28, at 1068-70.
The state's interest in fair and efficient sentencing of offenders outweighed the defend-
ant's minimal procedural rights:
Under the practice of individualizing punishments, investigational techniques
have been given an important role. Probation workers making reports of their
investigations have not been trained to prosecute but to aid offenders. Their
reports have been given a high value by conscientious judges who want to
sentence persons on the best available information rather than on guesswork and
inadequate information. To deprive sentencing judges of this kind of information
would undermine modem penological procedural policies that have been cau-
Washington University Open Scholarship
Number 4] DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO PSI REPORT DISCLOSURE
In Townsend v. Burke," the Supreme Court considered whether an
uncounseled offender's due process right was denied by a court that
sentenced him on the basis of "materially untrue" information.34 The
Court held that the absence of representation by counsel at the sentencing
hearing denied this offender due process of law.35 Read broadly, Town-
send held that sentencing on the basis of misinformation was a denial of
due process, and that an offender was entitled to the protection of
counsel. 36 The logical implication was that information on which the
sentence is based, including the PSI report, must be disclosed so that the
offender's counsel could rebut inaccurate information.3 7 Read more nar-
rowly, the Townsend Court was shocked by the irresponsible behavior of
the trial judge-not only his reliance on misinformation, but his abuse of
the uncounseled offender. 38 This interpretation does not compel the
tiously adopted throughout the nation after careful consideration and experimen-
tation. We must recognize that most of the information now relied upon by judges
to guide them in intelligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if
information were restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to
cross-examination. And the modem probation report draws on information con-
cerning every aspect of a defendant's life. The type and extent of this information
make totally impractical if not impossible open court testimony with cross-
examination. Such a procedure could endlessly delay criminal administration in a
retrial of collateral issues.
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 606 (1967) (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 249-50 (1949)).
33. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
34. Id. at 740-41. The erroneous information the sentencing judge relied on had been
disclosed to the defendant. The court did not inquire into how a defendant or his counsel
might challenge erroneous information if it were undisclosed. See United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (reliance on past invalid convictions); Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541 (1966) (errors in juvenile department report); United States v. Weston, 448
F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971) (unreliable conclusions in presentence report), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1061 (1972). See also Collins v. Buchkoe, 493 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Rollerson, 491 F.2d 1209, 1213 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215,
220 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 816 (2d Cir. 1970); Baker v.
United States, 388 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1968).
35. 334 U.S. at 740-41 ("counsel might not have changed the sentence, but he could
have taken steps to see that the conviction and sentence were not predicated on misinfor-
mation or misreading of court records"). See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 563
(1966) (duty of counsel to "denigrate" questionable information); United States v. Dock-
ery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1193 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971); Gray, Post-Trial Discovery: Disclosure of the Presentence Investigation Report, 4
U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1972); Note, supra note 26 at 263-71; 50 N.C.L. REv. 925, 928
(1972).
36. 334 U.S. at 740-41. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
37. United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1193 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). But see Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1948)
(Court did not mention Townsend).
38. 334 U.S. at 740-41.
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disclosure of information on which a sentence is based to an offender or
his counsel.3 9
In deciding Williams v. New York4° one year later, the Court read
Townsend4 narrowly. A jury convicted Williams of first degree murder
and recommended a life sentence. 42 On the basis of a PSI report,
however, the judge sentenced the defendant to death.43 At the sentencing
hearing, the judge stated the information he relied on; neither the defend-
ant nor his attorney attempted to refute it.' Although Williams claimed
that failure to allow rebuttal testimony and cross examination at the
sentencing hearing denied him due process,45 the Supreme Court en-
dorsed the modem sentencing theory that punishment should fit the
offender, and the use of PSI reports to accomplish this goal.
46
The Court in Williams, citing Townsend,47 recognized that the sen-
tencing process was not immune from due process requirements,48 and
39. See, e.g., Collins v. Buchkoe, 493 F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1974) (by implication);
United States v. Rollerson, 491 F.2d 1209, 1213 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Weston,
448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972); United States v.
Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1183 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); United States
v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 816 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Trigg, 392 F.2d 860 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968); Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931,933 (4th Cir.
1968); United States v. Weiner, 376 F.2d 42, 43 (3d Cir. 1967).
The due process clause protects a citizen's right to challenge the factual basis of
governmental action that affects him. See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
In criminal sentencing this has been applied to permit rebuttal of facts the court explicitly
relied upon. See, e.g., Shelton v. United States, 497 F.2d 156, 159 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Powell, 487 F.2d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 1973). The due process right to an accurate
factual basis for sentencing might be nullified by nondisclosure of potentially erroneous
PSI reports. An attorney in Townsend could have protected the defendant. See United
States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1193 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 951 (1971) ("How many. . . travesties of justice are hidden by nondisclosure of
the presentence report?"); Guzman, Defendant's Access to Presentence Reports in Feder-
al Criminal Courts, 52 IowA L. REV. 161, 164-66 (1966) (incidents of undetected errors in
presentence report).
Undetected errors in presentence reports have resulted in harsh sentences. See State v.
Killian, 91 Ariz. 140, 370 P.2d 287 (1962); State v. Pohlabel, 61 N.J. Super. 242, 160 A.2d
647 (App. Div. 1960). See also State v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 259 A.2d 895 (1969).
40. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
41. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
42. 337 U.S. at 242.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 244.
45. Id. at 245.
46. Id. at 247-50.
47. Id. at 252 n.18.
48. Id.
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may, therefore, have only endorsed the use of PSI reports . 49 By affirming
the trial judge's sentence despite his nondisclosure of the PSI report
before the hearing and his failure to provide the defendant an opportunity
to rebut,5' however, the Court apparently sanctioned the discretionary
use-including nondisclosure-of PSI reports. 51 Following Williams,
many state and lower federal courts have held that failure to disclose a
PSI report or to allow confrontation and cross examination of sources
contained therein does not violate due process.52
Since the Williams decision in 1949, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that convicted offenders have a limited liberty interest which is
entitled to due process protection in post-trial proceedings. 3 In Mempa
49. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 356 (1977); Note, Due Process in Sentenc-
ing, supra note 28, at 1073 & n.34.
50. 337 U.S. at 252.
51. Id. at 250. But see id. at 252-53 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
52. United States v. Dace, 502 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1121
(1975); United States v. Queen, 435 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Lloyd, 425
F.2d 711, 712 (5th Cir. 1970); Cook v. Willingham, 400 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Fischer, 381 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 973 (1967); Powers v.
United States, 325 F.2d 666 (1st Cir. 1963); Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87 (6th Cir.
1943); United States v. Durham, 181 F. Supp. 503 (D.D.C.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 854
(1960); McCormack v. State, 332 So. 2d 117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Morgan v. State,
142 So. 2d 308 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); People v. Peace, 18 N.Y.2d 230,233,219 N.E.2d
419, 420, 273 N.Y.S.2d 64, 66 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1967). Contra, United
States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1186 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 950 (1971).
In Williams, 337 U.S. at 246, the court justified the use of out-of-court information
because of the sentencing judge's wide discretion in fashioning individualized sentences.
For a criticism of this view, see K. DAVIS, supra note 26.
53. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (parole revocation); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443
1972) (sentencing); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455,465 (1971) (quoting Offutt v.
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)) ("justice must satisfy the appearance of justice");
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (sentencing in capital case); Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U.S. 128 (1967) (deferred sentencing); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1966)
(separate sentencing act); Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony,
81 HARV. L. REV. 821 (1968); Note, supra note 26, at 263-71.
The right-privilege distinction, previously used to justify denials of post-trial due
process, has been repudiated. The distinction was founded on the assumption that any
proceeding considering a sentence less than the statutory maximum was a privilege and
not a right entitled to procedural safeguards. E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481
(1972) (criminal). See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) (civil); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535,539 (1971) (civil); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,262 (1970) (civil);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969) (civil); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 404 (1963) (civil); United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1190 & n.15 (D.C. Cir.)
(Wright, J., dissenting) (criminal), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 450 (1971). See generally Van
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v. Rhayj 4 the Court held that defendant's liberty interest warranted
representation by counsel at sentencing. 55 Following this decision, de-
fendants have argued that their inability to challenge undisclosed errors
in PSI reports renders meaningless this due process protection at sentenc-
ing by preventing detection of potential errors. 56
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 1439 (1968).
Due process denials can no longer be based on either the distinction between criminal
trial and criminal post-trial proceedings or between criminal and civil proceedings. See In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-67 (1970) (juvenile proceedings); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,49-
50 (1967) (juvenile proceedings); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966) (contempt
arising from administrative law enforcement); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)
(waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction); Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965)
(contempt); The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1, 125 (1969) (noting
change from practice of labelling to functional due process analysis). Cf. Judice v. Vail,
430 U.S. 327 (1977) (civil contempt proceedings); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434
(1977) (civil enforcement proceeding); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (civil
seizure).
54. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
55. Id. at 134 (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948) ("appointment
of counsel for an indigent is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where
substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected").
After Mempa, the Court continued to afford defendants post-trial due process protec-
tion. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 516 (1972) (counsel required at time of
sentencing under a special commitment act); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521
(1968) (impartial sentencing body); Pugh & Carver, supra note 24; Note, Procedural Due
Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, supra note 53; Note, Disclosure of Presentence
Reports: A Constitutional Right to Rebut Adverse Information by Cross-Examination, 3
RUT.-CAM. L.J. 111, 113-15 (1971).
56. 50 N.C.L. REV. 925 (1972).
In a sector of the judicial process in which the stakes for society and the
defendant are so high as they are at sentencing, and in which procedural safe-
guards are inadequate, there is a strong case for developing a body of substantive
standards to ensure that sentences are not based on inaccurate assumptions of
little probative value.
Id. at 936. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948). See also United States v.
Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972); United States v.
Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1186, 1193 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., dissenting) cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971) (same harm prohibited by Townsend results from reliance on undisclosed
misinformation as from disclosed misinformation); Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d
599, 609 (9th Cir. 1968) (dictum), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925 (1969) (disclosure of sentenc-
ing information needed to effectuate right to counsel).
The convicted person has the burden of demonstrating error in the facts relied upon in
sentencing, although he may not have access to the PSI report. See, e.g., Collins v.
Buchkoe, 493 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Rollerson, 491 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir.
1974).
The tension between due process rights and sentencing discretion has stirred much
debate over PSI report disclosure. For arguments against disclosure, see Barnett &
Gronewold, Confidentiality of the Presentence Report, 26 FED. PROBATION 26 (1962);
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The Supreme Court's reevaluation of capital punishment and capital
sentencing procedures also implicates the nondisclosure of PSI reports. 57
In Furman v. Georgia,58 Gregg v. Georgia,9 Woodson v. North Caroli-
na,60 and Proffitt v. Florida,61 the Court recognized that capital punish-
ment is unique62 and that it would conform to the eighth amendment's 63
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment only if the process by
which it is imposed is and appears to be fair. 4 The process mandated by
Higgins, Confidentiality of Presentence Reports, 28 ALB. L. REV. 12 (1964); Higgins, In
Response to Roche, 29 ALB L. REV. 225 (1965); Parsons, The Presentence Investigation
Report Must be Preserved as a Confidential Document, 28 FED. PROBATION 3 (1964);
Parsons, supra note 28; Roche, supra note 32; Sharp, The Confidential Nature of Pre-
sentence Reports, 5 CATH. U.L. REV. 127 (1954); Thompsen, Confidentiality of the
Presentence Report: A Middle Position, 28 FED. PROBATION 8 (1964); Note, Use of the
Presentence Investigation in Missouri, supra note 28, at 405 (1964) (97% of Missouri
judges that responded believe nondisclosure of presentence reports does not violate due
process).
For arguments in favor of disclosure, see A.B.A., STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENC-
ING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 4.1-4.6 (Tent. Draft 1968); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 7.07(5) (Tent. Draft 1962); Gray, supra note 35; Lehrich, supra note 28; Pugh & Carver,
supra note 24; Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, supra
note 53; Note, Due Process in Sentencing, supra note 28; Note, Disclosure of Presentence
Reports: A Constitutional Right to Rebut Adverse Information by Cross-Examination,
supra note 55; 50 N.C.L. REV. 925 (1972); 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 960 (1972). For additional
sources, see Buchea v. Sullivan, 262 Or. 222, 226 n.7, 497 P.2d 1169, 1171 n.7 (1972).
57. In the past, PSI report disclosure did not depend on potential punishment. See
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1948) (capital); Segura v. Patterson, 402 F.2d
249, 253 (10th Cir. 1968) (capital), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 946 (1971); McCor-
mack v. State, 332 So. 2d 117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (capital).
58. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
59. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
60. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). On the same day, the Court invalidated Louisiana's manda-
tory death penalty statute in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
61. 428 U.S. 242 (1976). On the same day, the Court upheld Texas' discretionary
death penalty statute in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
62. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280,305 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,250-51 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 188 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
64. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,305 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242, 259 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-95 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 306, 311 (1972) (Stewart & White, J.J., concurring); State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1
(Fla. 1972). For source of requirement that decisions must appear to be and actually be
fair, see Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971) (criminal contempt); Offutt
v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (criminal contempt). Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349 (1977), adopts this standard.
See M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT (1973); England, Capital Punishment in the Light of Constitutional Evolution: An
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the eighth amendment65 requires a consideration of the character and
record of the offender, and reliability in determining whether the death
penalty is appropriate in the particular case. 66 Nondisclosure of pre-
sentence reports appears to violate this requirement.67
Analysis of Furman and Gregg, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 596 (1977); Tao, The Constitution-
al Status of Capital Punishment: An Analysis of Gregg, Jurek, Roberts, and Woodson, 54
U. DET. J. URB. L. 345 (1977); Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New
Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1690 (1974); Note, Capital Punishment: A
Review of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 261 (1976); Comment,
Furman v. Georgia-Deathknell for Capital Punishment? 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 107
(1972); Note, Capital Sentencing-Effect of McGautha and Furman, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 619
(1972); 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 671 (1973).
65. The eighth amendment embodies an evolving standard of decency. Trop v. Dul-
les, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The recent capital punishment cases may demonstrate an
evolution toward absolute fairness and reliability in "the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
305 (1976) (sentencing procedures controlled to insure reliability). See also Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 278 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
66. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259 (1976) (the eighth amend-
ment requires "informed, focused, guided, and objective inquiry into the question
whether [defendant] should be sentenced to death"); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-
95 (1976); State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). The eighth amendment has, in effect,
been used to provide procedural fairness consistent with the value of the capital defend-
ant's interests.
The use of the eighth amendment to mandate sentencing procedures is unusual. It is
founded on the premise that without structured fact finding hearings addressed solely to
the choice of life or death, capital punishment could not be imposed consistently. Lack of
consistency in capital punishment was the basis for the concurrences of Justices Stewart
and White in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309, 313 (1972) (Stewart and White, J.J.,
concurring). This unique use of the eighth amendment may mean that McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), is overruled. McGautha held that the unfettered discre-
tion of capital sentencing juries did not violate due process. See Comment, supra note 64,
at 139 ("McGautha v. California, which upheld the discretionary system of sentencing
offenders to death, has clearly been dealt a most fatal blow"); Note, Capital Sentencing-
Effect of McGautha and Furman, supra note 64, at 626 (Furman requires the same
procedures denied in McGautha but on eighth amendment grounds).
Chief Justice Burger in Furman, 408 U.S. at 400, argued that the control of sentencing
procedures was "essentially and exclusively a procedural due process question." He and
Justice Rehnquist believed that the eighth amendment only applied to testing certain types
of punishment. Id. at 398. See also Note, Capital Punishment: A Review of Recent
Supreme Court Decisions, supra note 64, at 265-67; Note, Discretion and the Constitution-
ality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, supra note 64, at 1695 n.27, 1699-1712 (list of
states repealing or amending their capital punishment statutes).
67. In addition, two other trends in penology militate in favor of PSI report disclo-
sure: First, the move toward uniform mandatory prison terms for the same crime commit-
ted under similar circumstances dictates that all relevant facts concerning the crime and
the offender be established accurately before the sentencing body. The goal of equal
punishment for equal crimes, with exceptions permitted only in unusual circumstances,
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The use and disclosure of presentence reports depends upon the juris-
diction. Most states as well as the federal judiciary require or permit the
use68 and disclosure69 of presentence reports.70 Even those jurisdictions
cannot be achieved unless defendants, their counsel, and the courts can identify sufficient
mitigating circumstances. Uniformity, therefore, is served if PSI reports, a determinative
factor in sentencing, are disclosed. For sources discussing mandatory uniform sentences,
see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (Deering Supp. 1977); Comment, CriminalLaw: Mandatory
Prison Sentences-A Case Study Approach, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 614 (1975) (problems,
constitutional and otherwise, with Oklahoma mandatory sentence act); Comment, Senate
Bill 42-The End of the Indeterminate Sentence, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 133 (1977) See
generally F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix, R. PARNAS, SENTENCING AND THE CORREC-
TIONS PROCESS 265-340 (1976); Diamond & Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of
Sentence Disparity and its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 110-16 (1976).
Second, the increasing availability of appellate review of sentences underscores the
need for PSI report disclosure. One factor used in determining the constitutionality of a
capital punishment statute is the availability of appellate review. See Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242, 250-51,258-59 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,204-06 (1976); State v.
Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973). Although noncapital sentences within the statutory
range have traditionally enjoyed immunity from appellate review, courts have begun to
scrutinize the fairness of all sentences. An accurate sentencing record is essential for
effective appellate review, and courts should require it to ensure the accuracy of the
record on appeal. For sources discussing appellate review, see Yates v. United States, 356
U.S. 363 (1958) (by implication); United States v. Hopkins, 531 F.2d 576 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. McKinney, 466
F.2d 1403 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971); Scott v.
United States, 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Thurlkill v. State, 551 P.2d 541 (Alas. 1976);
People v. Cooke, 117 II. App. 2d 2%, 300, 254 N.E.2d 293, 295 (1969); A.B.A., STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES § 1-3.4 (1968); M. FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 75-85 (1973); Blake, Appellate Review of
Criminal Sentences in the Federal Courts, 24 KAN. L. REV. 279, 302-03 (1976); Note,
Appellate Review of Sentences and the Need for a Reviewable Record, 1973 DUKE L.J.
1357, 1370-71; Note, The Rule of Nonreview: A Critical Analysis of Appellate Scrutiny of
Criminal Sentences, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 184, 184-99 (1975). But see Dorszynski v.
United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974); United States v. Gamboa, 543 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Sand, 541 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1976); Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338
(8th Cir. 1930); State v. Malory, 113 Ariz. 480, 557 P.2d 165 (1976); People v. Bradley, 43
I11. App. 3d 463, 357 N.E.2d 696 (1976); State v. Betts, 196 Neb. 572, 244 N.W.2d 195
(1976). Both of these trends challenge the rationale for nondisclosure.
68. See notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text.
69. Disclosure is required by either legislation, court rule, or case law. By legislation:
see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203d (Deering 1970); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4605 (Vernon
1971). By court rule: see e.g., State v. Vance, 117 Ohio App. 169, 191 N.E.2d 737 (1962)
(capital cases only); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 390.50 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977-1978);
WASH. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 7.2(c) (Supp. 1975). By case law: see, e.g., State v. Rolfe,
92 Idaho 467, 444 P.2d 428 (1968); Haynes v. State, 19 Md. App. 428, 311 A.2d 817 (1973);
State v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 259 A.2d 895 (1969).
70. In federal court, disclosure is provided by FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A):
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requiring disclosure, however, usually provide for exceptions to full
disclosure with attendant procedures for partial or nondisclosure. 7'
In Gardner v. Florida,72 the Supreme Court confronted the issue of
whether, in the context of capital punishment, the Constitution compels
the disclosure of PSI reports, and held that, except in extraordinary
cases, 73 the due process clause requires disclosure. States must make
known to the defendant or his counsel the information on which the
sentencing decision is based, and afford the defendant an opportunity to
comment thereon.74
(A) Before imposing sentence the court shall upon request permit the defendant,
or his counsel if he is so represented, to read the report of the presentence
investigation exclusive of any recommendation as to sentence, but not to the
extent that in the opinion of the court the report contains diagnostic opinion
which might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation, sources of information
obtained upon a promise of confidentiality, or any other information which, if
disclosed, might result in harm, physical or otherwise, to the defendant or other
persons; and the court shall afford the defendant or his counsel an opportunity to
comment thereon and, at the discretion of the court, to introduce testimony or
other information relating to any alleged factual inaccuracy contained in the
presentence report.
Prior to the 1975 amendment of the rule, disclosure had been discretionary. When the
discretionary rule was adopted in 1966, Justice Douglas argued:
[Wihile the formal rules of evidence do not apply to restrict the factors which the
sentencing judge may consider, fairness would, in my opinion, require that the
defendant be advised of the facts-perhaps very damaging to him--on which the
judge intends to rely. The presentence report may be inaccurate, a flaw which
may be of constitutional dimension. Cf. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736.
1966 Amendments to FED. R. CRIM. P., 383 U.S. 1087, 1092-93 (dissenting statement of
Douglas, J.).
See Brief for Petitioner at la-44a, lb-5b, Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). See
generally Note, Due Process in Sentencing, supra note 28. Discretionary disclosure is still
the rule in some states. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 789A.5 (West Supp. 1977); LA. CODE
CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 877 (1967); R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2). Still other states
make no statutory provision regarding disclosure. See, e.g., Griffith v. State, 504 S.W.2d
324,329 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). MIss. CODE ANN. § 47-7-9 (1976); Mo. R. CRIM. P. 27.07(b).
71. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A), supra note 70.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(B) established procedures upon nondisclosure under
Rule 32(c)(3)(A).
(B) If the court is of the view that there is information in the presentence
report which should not be disclosed under subdivision (c)(3)(A) of this rule, the
court in lieu of making the report or part thereof available shall state orally or in
writing a summary of the factual information contained therein to be relied on in
determining sentence, and shall give the defendant or his counsel an opportunity
to comment thereon. The statement may be made to the parties in camera.
See, e.g., ARiz. R. CRIM. P. 26.4(b) (Supp. 1977); MicH. GEN. CT. R. 785.12; WASH.
SUPER. CT. R. CRm. P. 7.2(c)(2) (Supp. 1976). Some states that permit partial nondisclo-
sure also require the sentencing judge either to include the confidential portions in the trial
record or summarize their contents. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 137.079 (1975); AIuz. R.
CRiM. P. 26.4(b) (Supp. 1977); WASH. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 7.2(c)(2) (Supp. 1976). Brief
for Petitioner at la-44a, lb-5b, Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
72. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
73. Id. at 360-61.
74. Id. at 362.
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Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality,75 distinguished Williams v.
New York 76 on three grounds: In Williams, the material portions of the
PSI report were communicated to the defendant in open court; in Gard-
ner they were not and, accordingly, defense counsel did not have the
opportunity to challenge the information.7 7 Secondly, society's attitude
toward capital punishment had changed so much since Williams that the
Court was justified in reexamining capital punishment procedures in light
of the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punish-
ment. 78 Finally, the extension of flexible due process requirements to
sentencing proceedings rendered the procedural discretion sanctioned by
Williams inapposite; 79 defendants' recently recognized liberty interest in
post-trial proceedings requires more protection than Williams offers. 80
The plurality then examined the state's justifications for nondisclosure"'
and concluded that they were outweighed in a capital case by the
defendant's paramount interest in procedural fairness in sentencing and
by the unique status of the death penalty. 2
75. The plurality consisted of Justices Stevens, Powell, and Stewart. These were the
same justices who constituted the plurality in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976). The Chief Justice and Justices White and Blackmun concurred. Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Rehnquist dissented.
76. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
77. 430 U.S. at 356.
78. Id. at 357-58. The plurality cites Justice Black's broad language in Williams to
license reevaluation of capital sentencing procedures "against evolving standards of
procedural fairness in a civilized society." Id. at 357 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183
(1971); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968)).
79. 430 U.S. at 358 (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); Specht v. Patterson,
386 U.S. 605 (1967)).
The plurality may be analogizing the special sentencing proceedings in capital punish-
ment to the special proceedings in Mempa (hearing on termination of deferred sentence)
and Specht (commitment under a special Sex Offenders Act). By citing Mempa and
Specht together the Court may be undermining the distinction between ordinary sentenc-
ing and sentencing under special commitment acts. See also McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S.
2(1968).
80. 430 U.S. at 358, 360-61. The Court implicitly adopted the following balancing test:
As applied to procedural rights at the sentencing hearing, due process analysis
requires us to weigh three interests: (1) the defendant's interest in the substantive
outcome of the hearing, (2) his interest in the particular right to know and meet
the evidence in the presentence report, and (3) the governmental interest in
continued secrecy of the report.
United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1190 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
81. See Brief for Respondent at 20-22, 29-34.
82. 430 U.S. at 358-61. The justifications proffered were protection of confidential
sources, enhancement of rehabilitation, prevention of delay, and preservation of sentenc-
ing discretion. Id.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss4/7
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Justice White, concurring on eighth amendment grounds, 3 argued that
Gardner violated the procedural requirements established in Woodson v.
North Carolina.84 To comply with the Woodson requirement that the
sentencing court consider the character of the offender and offense, a PSI
report was necessary; to ensure reliability in the imposition of the death
penalty, disclosure of all information was required.8 5 By confining his
concurrence to the eighth amendment, Justice White would limit the
disclosure of PSI reports to capital cases.86
The Court's ordering of PSI report disclosure in capital cases sub
silentio overruled the broad reading of Williams v. New York.A7 Al-
though Williams remains authority for the use of presentence investiga-
tive information, Gardner shatters the due process balance struck in
Williams favoring wide sentencing discretion.88
The most significant aspect of the Gardner opinion is the plurality's
apparently conscious decision to analyze PSI report disclosure under the
due process clause8 9 rather than the eighth amendment, as argued by
Justice Stevens, however, eschews uniform mandatory disclosure in capital cases by
acknowledging the possibility of partial or nondisclosure in exceptional circumstances.
But even in those cases, due process would require that the PSI report appear in the trial
record to facilitate appellate review. Id. at 360-61. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,
258-59 (1976); State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973).
83. 430 U.S. at 362-64 (White, J., concurring). The Chief Justice concurred without
opinion, and Justice Blackmun's concurrence was based on the eighth amendment analy-
sis in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976).
84. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
85. 430 U.S. at 363-64.
86. Id. at 364. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented on the ground that the death
penalty itself is unconstitutional. Id. at 365. In addition, Justice Brennan agreed with the
plurality's finding that nondisclosure in this case violated due process. Marshall said that
the Florida Death Penalty Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. 921.141 (West Supp. 1977), violated the
eighth amendment, because it sanctions the discretion and arbitrariness banned by Fur-
man v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Florida Death Penalty Act, approved by the
Court in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), contains, argued Marshall, many pro-
cedural deficiencies. Accordingly, he advocated reconsideration of Proffitt. 430 U.S. at
370.
Justice Rehnquist dissented, stating that the eighth amendment is concerned with the
character of a sentence and not with the process by which it is imposed. Capital
punishment is not cruel and unusual under the eighth and fourteenth amendments, and
they are not violated when the death sentence is imposed if the process has never before
been found to violate due process. Id.
87. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
88. Compare Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), with Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241 (1949).
89. 430 U.S. at 357-62.
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Justice White.9 This choice indicates that the Court will end its unique
use of the eighth amendment in capital punishment cases. 91 Rather than
graft the due process clause onto the eighth amendment and require that
the procedures by which courts impose the death penalty be and appear to
be fair, the Court will now look directly to the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Such reasoning may enable the Court later to
extend the disclosure requirement of Gardner to noncapital defendants as
society's notions about the liberty interest of a convicted defendant and
fair procedures evolve. 92 This extension is not required, however, be-
cause due process involves a balancing analysis, and the state's interest
in nondisclosure may be greater than the defendant's need to know in a
noncapital case.93 Indeed, although the state's rehabilitation argument94
90. Id. at 362-63 (White, J., concurring).
91. See note 66 supra. The eighth amendment historically has been used to examine
the character of punishments in the abstract and not to structure sentencing procedures.
Courts have applied it to invalidate entire statutes as well as punishments for specific
crimes. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). By using a
due process analysis in Gardner, the Court avoided confronting a statutory scheme that
reduced reliability in imposing the death penalty by permitting nondisclosure of part of the
sentencing record. FLA. STAT. ANN. 921.141 (West Supp. 1977) had been held constitu-
tional under the eighth amendment in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). Florida will
have to amend FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.713, or enact a separate mandatory disclosure rule
applicable to capital cases because its general disclosure provision, applicable to both
capital and noncapital cases, permits partial nondisclosure. See note 9 supra.
92. Notions of procedural fairness established in capital cases have often been ex-
tended to noncapital cases. For instance, the right to counsel was established in capital
cases, and then extended to all cases. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to
counsel at time of sentencing); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent's right
to counsel at trial); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (right to counsel at arraign-
ment); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) (right to counsel at time of pleading); Betts
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (sixth amendment right to counsel held inapplicable to
states), overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1962); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932) (counsel required in capital cases because of the defendant's great interest
in protecting his rights at trial). See generally Cohen, supra note 26, at 2; 41 FORDHAM L.
REv. 671, 676 & n.53 (1973).
The appellate review of sentences required in capital cases may be extended to non-
capital cases. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253, 258-59 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204-06 (1976);
note 67 supra.
Eighth amendment analysis, and the evolving standards of decency rule, assume that
society's conception of fairness and decency evolves through time. See Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,247 (1949). The due process
mandated by current eighth amendment analysis of capital punishment may be extended
as society changes.
93. It seems no other class of defendants could demonstrate as high an interest as that
of capital defendants.
94. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss4/7
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is not meritorious in capital cases because death eliminates any possibili-
ty of rehabilitation, in other cases the state's interest in rehabilitation
might justify nondisclosure. 95 Thus, by emphasizing the unique interests
of a defendant facing a death sentence, the court insulated its holding
from extension to noncapital cases.9 6 Although an eighth amendment
analysis would have explicitly confined the holding to capital cases, the
due process decision in Gardner does so implicitly.
To comply with Gardner, state capital punishment statutes must
require PSI report disclosure except in narrowly defined circum-
stances. 97 When nondisclosure is justified, the full PSI report must
nevertheless appear in the trial record. 98 Federal practice under Rule 32 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure remains unchanged because
Gardner is inapplicable to federal capital cases. 99 If Gardner is extended
to noncapital cases, however, the exceptions to disclosure in Rule 32 will
have to be amended to conform with disclosure exceptions permitted by
the Court.l°°
The Court's holding in Gardner is inadequate in two respects. First,
although it requires disclosure of presentence reports, it does not require
the use of PSI reports in all capital cases. Employing an eighth amend-
ment analysis, the Court could have held that PSI reports were indispen-
sable to ensure the procedural fairness required in capital cases. 101 Sec-
95. See note 82 supra.
96. The extension of due process in this case will not affect the Burger Court's
contraction of due process rights because the high interest of the capital defendant is
distinguishable from that of other defendants. The trend in the Burger Court may be
traced through cases. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
(1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423 (1973). See generally Stephens, The Burger Court: New Dimensions In Criminal
Justice, 60 GEo. L.J. 249 (1971); 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 480, 481-82.
The concern that sentencing hearings might evolve into full evidentiary hearings seems
unwarranted because of the structure already present in capital sentencing and the ease
with which Gardner can be distinguished from noncapital cases.
97. See notes 82 supra & 99 infra. See also Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality
of the New Death Penalty Statutes, supra note 66, at 1691.
98. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
99. The sole federal death penalty statute, which pertains to aircraft piracy where
another person is killed, has sentencing provisions requiring full disclosure. 49 U.S.C. §§
1472(i)(1)(B), 1473(c)(2)-(7) (Supp. V 1975). This statute provides for nondisclosure in
cases involving national security and the immediate safety of a confidential source. These
exceptions might justify nondisclosure in other capital cases.
100. 430 U.S. at 358-61.
101. See notes 64-66 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1977:728
Washington University Open Scholarship
Number 4] DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO PSI REPORT DISCLOSURE 745
ondly, it is anomalous to insure the accuracy of sentencing records only
in capital cases. In lieu of alternative means to achieve uniform accuracy
of sentencing records, PSI reports should be disclosed whenever they are
used. Although the Supreme Court has left open the possibility of
mandatory PSI report disclosure in all cases, Gardner carefully limits the
requirement to capital cases.
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